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The article considers the future of telecommunications national regulatory authorities (NRAs)
by analysing the way in which the European telecommunications regulatory framework in
general and the European Commission’s 1999 Review Communication in particular addresses
related questions. These comprise the concept of ‘regulation’, the scope of an NRA’s action, its
tasks, specific ways of action and related missions, including its dispute settlement functions,
cooperation between NRAs as envisaged in the need for a European Regulatory Authority and
the setting up of a High Level Communications Group and Communications Committee. The
article also examines the organization and functioning of NRAs, maintaining that efficient
performance of the various tasks requires obedience to certain principles and the presence of
certain characteristics which are outlined prior to more detailed discussion of the issues of
the requirement of independence and the possible role and impact of self-regulation.
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The national regulatory authorities are the cornerstone of the application in the
Member States of virtually the entire regulatory package as currently constituted, and
will play a major part in framing and applying the revised regulatory framework.
Fifth Implementation Report1
The reform of regulators is a critical aspect of regulatory reform in the
telecommunications sector. This article concentrates mainly on the
institutional issues raised by the European Commission’s Communication
on a new framework for Electronic Communications Infrastructure
Services.2 Telecommunications sector specific national regulatory
authorities (NRAs) are key players in today’s European telecommunications
regulatory framework. The article addresses a number of questions
concerning these NRAs. For instance:
• The meaning of the concept of ‘regulator’;
• The scope of an NRA’s action;
• The future roles of telecommunications sector specific
regulatory authorities and especially NRAs;
• The location of regulatory activity;
• The principles that should govern a regulator’s action; and 
• The characteristics that should distinguish these bodies.
While drawing examples and addressing issues at the
member state level, the article pays special attention to the
Belgian case.
The concept of national regulatory
authority 
While the concept of regulator could in general be considered
as referring primarily to the activity of rule making, the
concept of NRA does not, in the telecommunications
sector, mean an institution entrusted with the setting up of
the rules (eg institutions like parliaments or government)
but is, in principle, used to describe the body in charge of
rule implementation and application. Melody asserts that:
The regulator’s task is to implement government policy. It ensures
performance accountability by the PTO and other industry players
to economic and social policy objectives, resolves disputes between
competitors and between consumers and operators, monitors
changing industry conditions and advises government on
developments bearing on policy.3
According to the ONP Voice Telephony Directive,4
‘national regulatory authority means the body or bodies in
each Member State entrusted by that Member State with,
inter alia, the regulatory functions addressed in this
Directive’. These tasks, to be carried out by NRAs as
defined by the directives ruling the sector are indeed
basically rule application.5 In this sense the Services
Directive provides that ‘Member States shall ensure that
from 1 July 1991 the granting of operating licences, the
control of type approval and mandatory specifications, the
allocation of frequencies and numbers as well as the
surveillance of usage conditions are carried out by a body
independent of the telecommunications organizations’.6
1. European Commission, Communication
to the European Parliament, the Council,
the Economic and Social Committee and
the Committee of the Regions, Fifth Report
on the Implementation of the
Telecommunications Regulatory Package,
COM(1999) 537, 10.11.1999, p 9.
2. European Commission, Communication
to the European Parliament, the Council,
the Economic and Social Committee and
the Committee of the Regions, Towards a
new framework for Electronic
Communications infrastructure and
associated services – The 1999
Communications Review, COM(1999) 539,
10.11.1999 ( hereafter called 1999 Review
Communication), especially section 4.8.
3. William H. Melody, ‘Telecom reform:
progress and prospects’,
Telecommunications Policy, Vol 23, No 1,
1999, pp 12–13.
4. Article 2 (2) (g) of Directive 98/10/EC of
the European Parliament and of the
Council of 26 February 1998 on the
application of open network provision
(ONP) to voice telephony and on universal
service for telecommunications in a
competitive environment, OJ No L 101/24,
01.04.1998.
5. A recent study lists among those
functions: monitoring, controlling, making
decisions and enforcing the regime
pursuant to telecommunications law(s);
interpretation of telecommunications
law(s) (subject to Appeal) and if
necessary development and adoption of
(binding) regulations mandated by law;
administration of certain functions:
licensing, frequency management,
number management, tariff regulations,
interconnection, etc. (Eurostrategies,
Cullen International, Final Report on the
possible Added Value of European
Regulatory Authority for
Telecommunications, ECSC-EC-EAEC,
Brussels-Luxembourg, 1999, p 11).
6. Article 7 of Commission Directive
90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on competition
in the markets for telecommunications
services, OJ No L 192/10, 24.07.1990, as
modified by Article 1 (7) of Commission
Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996
amending Commission Directive 90/388/EEC
with regard to the implementation of full
competition in telecommunications
markets, OJ No L 74/13, 22.03.96.
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There are nevertheless a small number of cases where, notably because
of the general character of the envisaged measure and of the wide
discretion given to the NRA by the legal framework, some of its tasks
could be considered as rule making rather than rule application. Under
this sense fall Articles 8 (1) of the ONP Leased Lines Directive,7 and 13
(1) of the ONP Voice Telephony Directive providing that the NRAs lay
down the procedures whereby they decide on requests to refuse,
interrupt or restrict provision of leased lines or voice telephony
networks and services.8
One consequence of the adoption of the 1999 Review
Communication proposals would be increased responsibilities and
discretion for the NRA leading to the boundary between
rule making and rule application becoming increasingly
blurred.This would in particular result from the application
of the principle that effective enforcement of legal measures
is best when closest to the activities regulated, and from the
overall need to keep the regulatory framework sufficiently
flexible in order to be able to take into account market
developments and, especially, progress in the effective
establishment of a competitive market.9 One means for the
application of these principles would be the increased use of
flexibility clauses (sunset clauses ie provisions allowing
NRAs to lift existing obligations once the underlying
objectives are met or a target date is reached, as well as
forbearance ie provisions allowing NRAs to refrain from
imposing obligations as long as the underlying objectives are
met), going broadly beyond the cases foreseen today by the
annex of the ONP Framework Directive,10 by Article 10 (4),
para 2 of the ONP Leased Lines Directive and by Article 17
(6) of the ONP Voice Telephony Directive with regard to
requirements for cost oriented tariffs, as well as by Article 7
(1), para 2 of the ONP Voice Telephony Directive with regard
to provision of public pay phones. Furthermore,Article 8 (1)
and (2) of the ONP Interconnection Directive foresee a
flexibility clause in favour of member states and regarding
accounting separation.11 The new Framework Directive as
proposed by the 1999 Review Communication would
specify criteria for the implementation of such flexibility
clauses by NRAs.12
The importance of the issue lies on the one hand in the
fact that the increased powers of NRAs will call for an
effective coordination of their decisions and interpretations
in order to avoid fragmentation of the internal market.13
On the other hand, the transfer of rule making powers to
NRAs raises questions as to their democratic legitimacy,
especially in consideration of one of their major
characteristics: independence.
Another blurring of boundaries, of a more formal nature,
may result from the fact that, when listing the tasks of NRAs
European telecommunications directives (eg Article 2 (1) (b)
of the Licensing Directive)14 do not, in principle, provide for
a single NRA, and the tasks to be carried out may be
distributed among more than one body.15
7. Council Directive 92/44/EEC of 5 June
1992 on the application of open network
provision to leased lines, OJ No L 165/27,
19.06.1992 as modified by Directive
97/51/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 6 October 1997 amending
Council Directives 90/387/EEC and
92/44/EEC for the purpose of adaptation to
a competitive environment in
telecommunications, OJ No L 295/23,
29.10.1997. See also Commission Decision
98/80/EC of 7 January 1998 on amendment
of Annex II to Council Directive 92/44/EEC,
OJ NO L 14/27, 20.1.1998.
8. For other examples see Paul Nihoul:
Droit européen des télécommunications –
organisation des marchés, De Boeck &
Larcier, Brussels, 1999, pp 241–242.
9. 1999 Review Communication, pp 13–15.
10. Council Directive 90/387/EEC of 28
June 1990 on the establishment of the
internal market for telecommunications
services through the implementation of
open network provision, OJ No L 192/1,
24.07.1990 as modified by Directive
97/51/EC, op cit, Ref 7. It should
nevertheless be noted, that its Annex, pt.
3, may be considered as normal rule
application rather than as a real flexibility
clause. Indeed it provides that ‘where an
organisation no longer has significant
market power in the relevant market, the
requirement for cost orientation may be
set aside by the competent national
regulatory authority’.
11. Directive 97/33/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 30 June
1997 on interconnection in
Telecommunications with regard to
ensuring universal service and
interoperability through application of the
principles of Open Network Provision
(ONP), OJ NO L 199/32, 26.07.1997,
modified by Directive 98/61/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of
24 September 1998 amending Directive
97/33/EC with regard to operator number
portability and carrier pre-selection, OJ
No L 268/37, 3.10.1998. 
12. 1999 Review Communication, p 17.
13. 1999 Review Communication, pp 15, 55.
14. Directive 97/13/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 10 April
1997 on a common framework for general
authorizations and individual licences in
the field of telecommunications services,
OJ No L 117/15, 07.05.1997. See also Article
5 (a) (1) of the ONP Framework Directive.
15. Ibid.
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In most Member States these functions are shared between the independent
national regulator and the relevant Ministry, and in some cases a separate body
for spectrum aspects’.16
This calls especially for transparency if, in addition to their own specific
regulatory powers, this minister is, like in Belgium, the senior official of
the NRA, in order that ‘where the tasks assigned to the national
regulatory authority in Community legislation are undertaken by more
than one body, Member States shall ensure that the tasks to be
undertaken by each body are made public’.17 Even more so, distribution
of tasks among several bodies requires safeguards for the avoidance of
delays and duplication of decision making.18
From telecommunications to electronic
communications regulatory authority
The 1999 Review Communication proposes the separation of transport
and content regulation, while recognizing the links between them, and
the adoption of a more horizontal approach to all transport network
infrastructure and associated services, irrespective of the types of services
carried.19 The new regulatory framework proposed by the
Communication would therefore cover all electronic communications
infrastructures (eg fixed and mobile telecommunications networks, cable
TV networks, terrestrial broadcast networks as well as facilities such as
application program interfaces, which control access to services) and
associated services (ie communications and access services). Broadcasting
or information society services delivered over communications
infrastructure and content as such are not covered.20 This approach is
confirmed by the Commission in its ‘Principles and guidelines for the
Community’s audiovisual policy in the digital age’.21 The scope of
telecommunications regulatory authorities would, in
consequence, be extended to the entirety of electronic
communications infrastructures and associated services and
it could hence be appropriate to rebaptize them, once the
reform is adopted, eg ‘electronic communications
regulatory authorities’.
This approach has already been adopted by the Satellites
Directive.22 Its recital (17) states that ‘the provision of satellite
network services for the conveyance of radio and television
programmes is a telecommunications service…The content
of satellite broadcasting services…will continue to be
subject to specific rules…’. Other directives, like the ONP
Framework Directive in its Article 2 (3), nonetheless exclude
radio and television broadcasting from the definition of
telecommunications services, without differentiating
between technical and content related aspects. As
technological convergence implies that specific
(telecommunications or broadcasting) services may be
carried over different competing networks23 and do no
longer qualify a specific network exclusively as broadcasting
or telecommunications infrastructure, the approach
proposed by the 1999 Review Communication appears to
us as the right one.
As pointed out in a DG XIII Discussion Document,
attention should nevertheless be paid to the recognition of
16. 1999 Review Communication, p 58.
17. Article 5 (a) (1) of the ONP Framework
Directive (1997).
18. Problems with regard to this issue
have been noted in some member states
by the Fifth Implementation Report, pp
9–11, 32. See also 1999 Review
Communication, p 58.
19. 1999 Review Communication, p 6.
20. Idem, p 4. See especially the list of
definitions. See also p 21.
21. European Commission, Communication
from the Commission to the Council, the
European Parliament, the Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions, Principles and guidelines for
the Community’s audiovisual policy in the
digital age, COM(1999) 657, 14.12.1999,
especially pp 10–11.
22. Commission Directive 94/46/EC of 13
October 1994 amending Directive
88/301/EEC and Directive 90/388/EEC in
particular with regard to satellite
communications, OJ No L 268/15,
19.10.1994.
23. European Commission, op cit, Ref 21,
footnote 17.
24. Section 2.2. The links between content
and infrastructure, DG XIII Discussion
Document, The 1999 Review: regulatory
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the links between transport and content regulation24: eg ‘under the so-
called “must carry rule”, rights granted…to certain broadcasters for the
provision of content, result in obligations for cable television networks
to carry certain programmes’.This could generate problems with regard
to transmission capacity available. Another example of the need for
collaboration between the different authorities concerned is the
existence of vertically integrated operators. Furthermore, it should be
mentioned that national implementation of the Commission’s approach
may raise issues of constitutionality regarding the distribution of
competencies in countries where different levels of powers are involved.
In Belgium, for example, the Federal State is responsible for
telecommunications, while the Flemish, French and German-speaking
communities are responsible for broadcasting (including the majority of
technical aspects).
Tasks, ways of action and missions 
Shaping the sector
The functions an NRA has to ensure, while carrying out its regulatory
activity, may be categorized in several ways. Under today’s regulatory
framework, an NRA may indeed be considered as having five tasks
while performing rule application and implementation:
• first, it has to organize and structure the market by interpreting and
applying the rules in a proactive way upon their designated subjects
(operators, users) and this through the imposition of specific
obligations and behaviour, or through permitting particular behaviour
(eg authorizing market access);
• second, it has to control the application of the rules by their designated
subjects and their respect of their obligations;
• third, it intervenes in dispute settlement;
• fourth, it monitors and assesses market development, demand as well as
supply. Doing so allows an NRA to fulfil its other tasks (eg by making
it possible to define those operators having significant market power
or to control whether universal service is provided in an appropriate
way) but enables it also to provide useful input to rule makers; and
• fifth, it ensures a European and international dimension by
collaborating with other NRAs on specific cases having a transborder
dimension or by participating in European or international
committees and organizations.
In carrying out its tasks, sector specific (tele)communications regulation
and regulators adopt a specific way of action.We could say, that under
sector specific regulation a proactive approach is adopted, aimed at
shaping and organizing the sector.25 Competition rules and competition
authorities, on the other hand, would act in a more repressive,
controlling way, adopting more the role of policeman, aiming to prevent
and stop certain behaviour which adversely affects competition. It
should nevertheless be added that this distinction is particularly true
with regard to cases of abuse of dominant positions (article 82 of the EC
Treaty). In the context of procedures under article 81 of the
EC Treaty or in merger cases the European Commission,
acting as competition authority, increasingly tends towards
pursue a proactive approach by setting conditions or
obtaining undertakings from the parties to the transaction.
25. Obligations imposed may therefore in
general be considered rather as
‘obligations to do’ (eg provide access and
information, ask for an individual
authorization). Obligations imposed may
nevertheless also imply an abstention 
(eg not to discriminate).
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Its specific approach enables sector specific regulation and regulators
implementing this regulation to pursue other policy objectives and
related missions than just the maintenance of competition, basic function
and aim of competition rules.Among these objectives may be listed the
organization of the (tele)communications sector’s transition towards
effective competition.26 Besides this first objective, sector specific
regulation and regulators are designed to meet general policy objectives
such as ensuring users’ rights,27 either by guaranteeing the provision of
specific services (eg universal service or a minimum set of leased lines
and, in general, ensuring the interoperability of certain services for all
users)28 or by the introduction of consumer protection measures.Another
general policy objective of sector specific regulation is to contribute to
the emergence of a single market through application of EU
harmonization measures.29 It could be mentioned in this context that the
Fifth Implementation Report underlines the importance of ensuring
that  ‘NRAs use their powers ... in a proactive manner, for example to
stimulate competitive markets and ensure the fair and proper
development of a harmonized European telecommunications market’.30
According to the 1999 Review Communication, while regulation
primarily designed to manage the transition to competition would be
progressively reduced as markets become fully competitive, regulation
designed to meet other policy objectives and especially general interest
objectives will remain in place,31to the extent ‘that policy objectives
cannot be achieved by competition only’32 (eg the concept of universal
service aiming to ensure provision of basic services to
uneconomic customers).33 In this context, the 1999 Review
Communication recalls that as far as public interest
objectives, such as protection of minors and human dignity,
are concerned, open and competitive markets cannot
contribute.34
In general, and even with regard to issues which could be
linked to the emergence of competition, sector specific
regulators might remain necessary once effective competition
exists, to the extent that their typically proactive and
structuring approach would remain important for specific
issues (eg management and allocation of scarce resources
needed by possible new competitors in order to enter a market,
even if this market were, in general, already competitive). In this
context, an examination should also be made of the extent to
which only the more passive functions, such as monitoring or
control, would be retained in the long term for sector specific
regulators, in some cases eventually complemented with some
reserve powers (for a limited period of time). Universal service
is an example where the overall principle would be that of
reliance on its provision by the market, but under the
supervision of the NRA, in charge to inform for example the
Parliament if new features should be foreseen as universal
service. Furthermore, this NRA could, (for a limited period
of time) intervene in case of market failure or in general
manage a Universal Service Funds.35
One might finally envisage a number of sector specific
requirements being removed in the long term in favour of
horizontal regulations, other than competition rules, and
especially consumer protection rules.36
26. See for example Article 9 (1) and (3) of
the ONP Interconnection Directive.
27. See 1999 Review Communication,
especially section 4.5.
28. Article 3 of the ONP Voice Telephony
Directive, Article 7 of the ONP Leased
Lines Directive and Article 3 (2) of the
ONP Interconnection Directive.
29. On the objectives pursued by sector
specific telecommunications regulation,
see Robert Queck, Philippe Defraigne,
‘Réflexions sur la notion de ‘puissance sur
le marché’ en droit des
télécommunications: concept autonome
ou chimère?’, in Etienne Montero (ed),
Droit des technologies de l’information:
regards prospectifs, Cahiers du CRID No
16, Bruylant, Brussels, 1999, pp 335–70.
See also 1999 Review Communication, 
pp 11–13.
30. Fifth Implementation Report, p 9. For
nuances, see p 11.
31. 1999 Review Communication, pp 3,13.
On the relationship between sector
specific regulation and competition law,
see also 1999 Review Communication, 
pp 19–20, 29, 30, 35, 41, 47, 52–55.
32. Jean-Eric de Cockborne, ‘The 1999
communications review: improving
Europe’s competitive position, info, Vol 1,
No 6, December 1999, p 478. 
33. 1999 Review Communication, p 41.
34. 1999 Review Communication, Ref 5.
These objectives are anyway rather
content-related and therefore not really
covered by the 1999 Review. 
35. See, for example, para 17–22 of the
German Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG),
25 July 1996, BGBl. I p 1120.
36. 1999 Review Communication, pp 13, 
16, 45.
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Dispute settlement
Among other rule application tasks NRAs are, entrusted by various
directives with dispute settlement functions,37 either leading to a decision38
or merely as conciliation.39 These powers are exercised by NRAs in
addition to those of the normal courts.The competencies of the courts
remain untouched.40 The rationale behind the alternative so created is the
need for rapid decisions (or conciliations) by bodies possessing sector
specific know how and the fact that the directives seem to assume that one
may, for this purpose, not just rely on common courts. In the words of the
ONP Voice Telephony Directive, ‘easily accessible and in principle
inexpensive procedures shall be available at a national level to
resolve…disputes in a fair, transparent and timely manner’.41
The 1999 Review Communication underlines the
necessity to require member states to ‘ensure that simple and
inexpensive complaint handling and dispute settlement
procedures exist for users and consumers, other than via
national courts’.42 The body implementing these procedures
could be the normal (tele)communications sector specific
NRA. It could also be another sector specific or even a
generic body (eg an ombudsman – while the latter acts
however only as conciliator).43 This recalls Article 26 (1) of
the ONP Voice Telephony Directive which foresees the
‘right to bring cases before the national regulatory authority
or another independent body’.
While the intervention of an NRA or ombudsman as
conciliator appears to be useful, I hesitate to fully support the
creation of a dispute resolution body with the power to
decide, other than the normal courts or arbitrators.The first
inconvenience seems to be the multiplication of authorities.
Indeed, the coexistence of telecommunications dispute
resolution mechanisms alongside normal courts creates a
problem of transparency and possible conflict between
contradictory decisions of authorities which are all
competent within their specific legal jurisdiction. Another
inconvenience of an NRA’s dispute resolution power is that
it might raise, in continental law countries like Belgium,
issues of consistency with the national constitution, with
regard to the competencies such a ‘non-court’ body could
have. Under the Belgian Constitution,44 only disputes
concerning so called ‘political rights’ (eg competition law
related questions) may be treated by special jurisdictional
authorities while disputes having as their object ‘civil rights’
(eg in principle those generated by contracts) are the
exclusive competence of the courts. With regard to the
Belgian example, these questions would be addressed in the
context of a complaint introduced before the administrative
court section of the Belgian Council of State.45
The comments concerning constitutionality are even
emphasized by considerations related to infringments to the
principle of separation of executive and judicial powers,
especially when the same body combines the majority of
powers foreseen by directives, including dispute resolution.
There might indeed be concerns that this body (and its
members) would act as an executive as well as a judicial
body.46 For example, it would intervene first, in application
37. For an inventory of bodies dealing with
dispute resolution in the
telecommunications sector, see The
European Telecommunications Platform
(ETP): Inventory of Dispute Resolution
Mechanisms: What are the Choices for
the Telecommunication Sector?,
ETP(98)107, ETP, Brussels, 1998, pp 83 + VII.
38. See for example Articles 9 (5) and 11 of
the ONP Interconnection Directive,
Articles 13 (1) and 26 (1) of the ONP Voice
Telephony Directive.
39. See for example Article 12 (1)-(3) of the
ONP Leased Lines Directive.
40. See for example Article 13 (1) in fine of
the ONP Voice Telephony Directive or
Article 12 (b) of the ONP Leased Lines
Directive. See also European Commission,
Notice on the application of the
competition rules to access agreements
in the telecommunications sector:
Framework, relevant markets and
principles, OJ No C265/2, 22.08.1998, pt 11.
41. Article 26 (1).
42. 1999 Review Communication, p 46. See
also pp 12, 15. With regard to access
issues, see pp 29, 31, 37.
43. 1999 Review Communication, p 46.
44. Constitution coordonnée du 17 février
1994, Moniteur belge, 17 February 1994,
Articles 144 and 145.
45. Complaint for annulment submitted
January 2000 by Belgacom against an
‘Arrêté royal du 4 octobre 1999 organisant
la procédure devant la Chambre pour
l’interconnexion, les lignes louées, l’accès
spécial et les utilisations partagées, ainsi
que le fonctionnement de celle-ci’
(Belgian Official Journal 24.11.1999). This
‘Chamber’ is a dispute resolution body
vested with decisional powers and
constituted on a case by case basis within
the NRA, the Belgian Institute of Postal
Services and Telecommunications (BIPT).
46. In this context the Belgian Council of
State wrote, on the possibility to appoint
members of the BIPT as arbitrators for
disputes arising between
telecommunications operators, ‘these
physical persons may not be chosen
within the BIPT by reason of the fact that
BIPT carries out a regulatory function of
the telecommunications market, so that
they do not have the impartiality required
in order to carry out judicial action’
(translation) Doc parl (B), Chambre,
Session 1997/1998, 1265/1, p 168.
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of Article 9 (3) of the ONP Interconnection Directive in an
interconnection negotiation between two parties, and could be called
afterwards to resolve, according to Article 9 (5) of the same Directive, a
dispute which has arisen between these two organizations concerning
the same interconnection.The problem could be considered as being of
limited scope in practice due to the existence of procedures for
appealing against NRA decisions. It could be avoided by entrusting, with
the dispute settlement role, a body other than the usual NRA.
Even if these difficulties with regard to national constitutions could
possibly be overcome, the problems mentioned here are a further
example of the more fundamental question, that is, the way in which
sector specific European (tele)communications regulation fits into the
general legal systems of member states.
There are also concerns about the speed of decision taking and the
presence of technical know how, which have been used as key
arguments in favour of the creation of ‘non-court’ dispute resolution
procedures. Concerning the speed of decision making, it must be noted
that directives foresee tight deadlines imposed upon NRAs acting as
dispute resolution bodies.47 Despite this, these deadlines may turn out to
be much longer, as Article 5 (a) (3) of the ONP Framework Directive
also foresees that, ‘Member States shall ensure that suitable mechanisms
exist at national level under which a party affected by a decision of the
national regulatory authority has a right of appeal to a body independent
of the parties involved’.48 Indeed, as pointed out by the Fifth
Implementation Report, ‘in some Member States, the procedures for
appealing against decisions by the regulator may create lengthy
delays…or have suspensory effect…’.49 The exact meaning and method
of appeals application against NRA decisions also raise questions, and are
today the subject of a reference for a preliminary ruling by the Court of
Justice of the European Communities by the Verwaltungsgerichtshof
(Austria) in November 1999.50 The considerations regarding the need for
appeal procedures could be applied mutatis mutandis to the decisions of
other non-court dispute resolution bodies.
It must be added that common courts may offer fast procedures. In this
way, under Belgian law, an action demanding the cessation of
infringements (in particular any behaviour going against honest practices
in commercial matters) against the law of 14 July 1991 on commercial
practices and on the information and protection of consumers51
introduced before the president of the commercial court52 may take,
appeal included, six months at best but usually about one year.
With regard to the need for specific know how, there is
no doubt about the complexity of technological and market
evolutions characterizing the sector. Bringing the necessary
expertise into dispute resolution decisions does not,
however, necessarily require equipping NRAs with special
dispute resolution powers or the creation of other
specialized bodies. It is indeed possible to entrust the
(tele)communications NRA with an expert function before
the courts or to create specialized chambers within those
courts most concerned (eg commercial courts).
47. See for example the deadline of 6
month imposed by article 9 (5) of the ONP
Interconnection Directive.
48. See also 1999 Review Communication,
p 17 as well as Licensing Directive,
Articles 5(3) and 5(4).
49. Fifth Implementation Report, p 11, 32.
50. Court of Justice, Case C-462/99:
Reference for a preliminary ruling by the
Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austria) by order
of 24 November 1999 in the appeal
brought by Connect Austria Gesellschaft
für Telekommunikation GmbH against the
Telekom-Control-Kommission (intervening
party: Mobilkom Austria
Aktiengesellschaft), OJ No C 47/20,
19.02.2000.
51. Belgian Official Journal 29.08.1991. 
52. Ibid. See, especially, Articles 93–100.
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Localization: at European and/or at member
state level
Context and key issues
One of the key words of the 1999 Review Communication is
cooperation between NRAs.An NRA may not consider just its limited
home market and national regulatory framework. There are several
reasons for this. On the one hand, the fact that with progress in
establishing the internal market, the number of transnational and trans-
European operators and applications is increasing. These situations,
which go beyond the geographical scope of the competencies of one
specific NRA, may be addressed through collaboration between the
different national authorities concerned or by the creation of a
European regulatory authority.
On the other hand, the fact that market development  and legal and
administrative traditions are still significantly different in member
states,53 combined with the principle that ‘primary responsibility for
achieving objectives set out in sector-specific Community legislation
should rest with the independent national regulators’,54 and with the
‘increased delegation of decision-making to NRAs’55 (eg by applying
flexibility clauses), taken together call for ensuring consistency of
member state interpretation with Community directives and for
increased coordination of NRAs’ interpretation and decisions in order
to avoid fragmentation of the internal market.56 These issues are
addressed below through comments on a European Regulatory Authority
and on the institutional arrangements proposed by the 1999 Review
Communication in its section 4.8.1.
A European regulatory authority?
The idea of a European regulatory authority for the telecommunications
sector (ERA) – which should now rather be a European regulatory
authority for electronic communications infrastructure and associated
services – was proposed by the 1994 Bangemann Group Report.57
Without defining in depth the remissions of such an
authority, the report nevertheless proposed that it should for
example regulate those operations which, because of their
Community-wide nature, need to be addressed at the
European level such as licensing, network interconnection
and if necessary, management of scarce resources or provide
advice to member states regulatory authorities on general
issues. The idea of an ERA was taken up by the ONP
Interconnection Directive and by the ONP Framework
Directive, which both mandated the European Commission
to investigate, in a report delivered not later than 31
December 1999, ‘the added value of the setting up of a
European Regulatory Authority to carry out those tasks
which would prove to be better undertaken at Community
level’.58 In order to perform this reporting task, the 1999
Review Communication (especially its sections 2.5 and 4.8)
builds on a study finalized in 1999 and based on a broad
survey of players in the telecommunications sector.59 The
study followed two earlier reports dealing at least partially
with the issue of the establishment of an ERA.60,61
The first question to be asked relates to the overall legal
possibility of creating a European regulatory authority under
53. 1999 Review Communication, p 12 and
Fifth Implementation Report, p 32.
54. 1999 Review Communication, p 15.
55. 1999 Review Communication, p 55.
56. 1999 Review Communication, pp 15, 55,
58. One could call this issue a need to
avoid dis-harmonization on the basis of
harmonization directives.
57. High Level Group on the Information
Society (‘Bangemann Group’), Europe and
the Global Information Society:
Recommendations to the European
Council, 26.05.1994, p 13.
58. Article 22 (2) of the ONP
Interconnection Directive and Article 8 of
the ONP Framework Directive.
59. Eurostrategies, Cullen International, 
op cit, Ref 5. 
60. Forrester Norall & Sutton, The
Institutional Framework for the Regulation
of Telecommunications and the
Application of the EC Competition Rules,
ECSC-EC-EAEC, Brussels-Luxembourg,
1996, especially pp 51–82.
61. NERA, Denton Hall, Issues Associated
with the Creation of a European Regulatory
Authority for Telecommunications, ECSC-
EC-EAEC, Brussels-Luxembourg, 1997, 
p 122.
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the current EC Treaty. In this way ‘any attempt to create a new regulatory
body with a policy function or an appellate role would require a Treaty
amendment… Legally it would be possible under the Treaty to create a
body…with an essentially ‘managerial’ or ‘operational’ role”.62 According
to case law of the Court of Justice,63 the powers delegated to the ERA
should be strictly and clearly defined executive powers and not imply a
wide margin of discretion for the delegate, as this would allow him or her
to replace the delegator’s choices, which would involve a transfer of
responsibilities.64 The NERA study notes that ‘the distinction between
constrained discretion and policy making power is sometimes difficult to
draw’.65 In this sense an ERA could administer spectrum auctioning rules
but not be vested with the general power to allocate spectrum in the
‘public interest’.66 Furthermore, stepping in to determine
interconnection terms in cases where the operators cannot agree, would
be considered by the NERA study as ‘executive powers’, while deciding
in general whether operators should be required to allow
interconnection would not, and therefore require Treaty amendment.67
Even if legally possible, the 1999 Review Communication is not in
favour of a European regulatory authority.68 Indeed, addressing the issue
in its pages 9 and 10, it states that,‘the Commission considers at this stage
that the creation of a European regulatory authority would not provide
sufficient added value to justify the likely costs…The issues identified (by
the Eurostrategies/Cullen International study), that might be better dealt
with at EU level, can be addressed through adaptation and improvement
of existing structures’ and do not need a separate, new authority. The
Communication lists among those issues ‘competition, development of a
pan-European market, interconnection and significant market power, and
enforcement’.69 The Communication continues by saying that the issues
on which dissatisfaction with the functioning of NRAs has been
expressed (eg in interconnection, licensing, competition,
consumer protection, frequency management and number
assignment’), also do not appear to justify the establishment
of a new agency:
The existing regulatory framework already requires Member States
to implement appeal mechanisms against NRA decisions at
national level, and the Commission considers that the primary aim
should therefore be to improve the consistency of NRA actions and
the effectiveness of corrective mechanisms available.
However, there are issues with regard to which a European
regulatory authority could be considered as not just value-
adding, but even as being the most practical (and maybe
only) solution (regardless of whether one would consider
the related competences to require an EC Treaty
amendment or not).70 This is the case in issues such as the
definition of a specific organization’s significant market
power with regard to transnational activities covering more
than one member state. In these cases the problem is not so
much to coordinate NRA application of the triggers
associated with significant market power in their respective
member states,71 but to cope with the fact that the
geographical market to be considered may extend beyond
one Member State and does not allow an approach limited
to a specific member state.This problem remains, especially
if under the 1999 Review the geographical market is no
62.Ibid, p 117.
63. See especially ECJ Judgements of 13
June 1958, Cases 9/56 and 10/56, Meroni v
High Authority, [1958 January–July] ECR 9
and 51.
64. Ibid, especially pp 43–44, 81–82. See
Forrester Norall & Sutton, op cit, Ref 60,
pp 60–61; NERA, Denton Hall, op cit, Ref
61, pp 53-55.
65. Ibid, p 55.
66. Ibid. For other examples see in general
pp 61–64.
67. Ibid, pp 62, 117–18.
68. 1999 Review Communication, pp 9–11, 55.
69. See also Eurostrategies, Cullen
International, op cit, Ref 5, p 34, 37–38,
74–75, 81.
70. See also: Damien Gerardin,
‘L’ouverture à la concurrence des
entreprises de réseau – analyse des
principaux enjeux du processus de
libéralisation’, Cahiers de droit européen,
1999, No 1–2, p 47; Thomas Kiessling and
Yves Blondeel, ‘The EU regulatory
framework in telecommunications: a
critical analysis’, Telecommunications
Policy, Vol 22, No 7, 1998, p 591; and John
Worthy and Rohan Kariyawasam, ‘A pan-
European Telecommunications regulator?,
Telecommunications Policy, Vol 22, No 1,
1998, pp 1–7.
71. This case is considered by the 1999
Review Communication in p 54 and in
general in section 4.8.1.
261the future
of national telecommunications regulatory authorities
longer ex ante linked by legislation to the territory of a specific member
state.72 The granting of frequencies for pan-European satellite services
may be another example. Beyond their transnational dimension, the
situations just mentioned share two other characteristics. They need a
decision implying legal consequences, and this decision is the result of
the day to day execution of a regulatory activity.The Commission may
take binding decisions applying Community Directives. We are
nevertheless not sure that such decisions, taken on a proposal by the
High Level Communications Group or by the Radio Spectrum Policy
Expert Group, and in consideration of the opinion of the
Communications Committee delivered under the regulatory
procedure,73 would be the appropriate tool to manage these cases.
Furthermore, one might wonder whether acting this way would in fact
turn the Commission itself into a European regulatory authority.
High Level Communications Group and Communications Committee 
The 1999 Review Communication ascertains that ‘improvement of
existing institutional arrangements…will be more effective than setting
up a completely new European regulatory institution’.74 These
arrangements would at first consist in the setting up of a High Level
Communications Group (HLCG). Its main task would be to assist ‘the
Commission in maximizing uniform application of national measures
adopted under the regulatory framework laid down in Community
legislation’.75The HLCG would therefore act as consensus builder between
NRAs, cooperate with bodies at European level (consumer and industry
representatives, standards bodies, advisory groups, etc) as well as provide
input (eg suggestions for measures, positions on problems brought to its
attention, expertise in the drawing up of guidelines on market definitions,
etc) to the European Commission. Furthermore, the Commission would
be assisted in a more formal way by a Communications Committee
(COCOM), created under the ‘Comitology Rules’,76 replacing existing
committees (ONP Committee, Licensing Committee) and acting as
advisory (ie for cases of opinion on drafts of non-binding Commission
measures) or as regulatory (ie for cases of opinion on drafts of binding
measures) committee.The HLCG would be composed of the
Commission and the NRAs.The COCOM would include
the Commission and member state representatives.
Some comments should be made concerning the HLCG,
and this firstly with regard to the general HLCG task of
contributing to a consistent and coordinated implementation
of Community measures by member states and with regard
to its specific task of ‘adopting agreed NRA positions on the
detailed application of Community legislation,with a view to
facilitating pan-European services’.77
From a legal perspective,while taking member states’ (and
their NRAs’) ‘primary responsibility for achieving objectives
set out in sector-specific Community legislation’78 into
account, it is in the end up to the European Commission
(under the control of the European Court of Justice), should
the occasion arise assisted by the COCOM, to ensure
general implementation of Community legislation and to
decide whether an interpretation adopted by a member state
is consistent with EC directives or not.79 It is therefore also
up to the Commission to draft, assisted by the COCOM in
its regulatory capacity and without prejudice to the powers
72. 1999 Review Communication, p 54.
73. 1999 Review Communication, p 56. 
74. 1999 Review Communication, p 55.
75. 1999 Review Communication, p 57.
According to its page 56 (and footnote 83),
the HLCG would take over from the
current High Level Regulators Group.
However, while the latter is just
established by a Council Resolution, the
HLCG would be based upon a Directive.
76. Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28
June 1999 laying down the procedures for
the exercise of implementing powers
conferred on the Commission, OJ No L
184/23, 17.07.1999. See also OJ No C 203/1,
17.07.1999.
77. 1999 Review Communication, p 57.
78. 1999 Review Communication, p 15. See
also Article 10 EC Treaty.
79. See Articles 211 and 202 of the EC
Treaty. Nevertheless, with regard to
implementation, ‘the Council may also
reserve the right, in specific cases, to
exercise directly implementing powers
itself’ and in these cases not confer these
powers on the Commission (EC Treaty,
Article 202, 3rd indent).
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of the Council (and of the European Parliament) under article 5 of the
Comitology Rules, binding ‘Commission Decisions to require certain
actions to be undertaken, eg to ensure harmonised application of
Community law in a specific area’,80 or to launch infringment
procedures.81 The power to decide in these matters could not be
delegated to the HLCG as it would give them too much discretion (with
regard to Commission’s enforcement powers) or undue subdelegation
(with regard to implementation powers delegated to the Commission by
Council and Parliament directives).82
Even if (uniform) ‘enforcement of Community legislation is the
responsibility of the Commission under the EC Treaty’,83 and even if the
‘last word’ with regard to consistent implementation remains with the
Commission, the High Level Communications Group may
nevertheless play a valuable role with regard to ensuring
consistent and coordinated interpretation and application of
EC directives. The experience gathered with the Working
Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the
Processing of Personal Data84 (hereafter Article 29 Group)
may serve as example.This group was created by the Data
Protection Directive85 alongside a normal Comitology
Committee,86 such as the proposed Communications
Committee.The HLCG may become an appropriate forum
for coordination, relying on ‘consensus building processes
among European regulators in which all interested parties
are able to state their views’.87 Indeed the NRAs sitting in
the High Level Group will do this not as representatives of
their member state of origin, and may therefore adopt a
view centred on the (community wide) interest of the
sector, without, at least in principle,88 having as one task the
defence of national positions in the context of Commission
implementation measures, as would be the case for the
members of the Communications Committee.89 This
greater freedom of positions of the HLCG would remain,
even if the NRA were also, as is the case today for some
member states, to sit in the Communications Committee.
Furthermore, the fact of not being constituted under the
Comitology Rules gives more freedom to the HLCG in the
organization of its work. Finally, even if agreed NRA
positions were not to be considered as having a binding
legal effect on a member state’s NRA, they could have in
fact a high ‘moral binding’ effect, as has been proved in the
context of recommendations of the Article 29 Group. Even
more so, one could imagine NRAs engaging to respect the
common positions, subject to the Commission’s power to
reject them as not being a consistent interpretation of
Community legislation.
It should be noted that cooperation between NRAs
(coordination of positions within the HLCG as well as
collaboration in cases brought before them) might especially
require modification of national rules concerning
confidentiality of information received, in order to allow an
NRA to communicate complete information regarding a
specific issue to other NRAs.90
Among the possible activities of the HLCG, the 1999
Review Communication mentions ‘monitoring and
80. 1999 Review Communication, p 56.
81. Article 226 EC Treaty. In this context it
appears worthwhile to investigate
whether the Commission’s task would not
be facilitated by the application of
measures concerning provision of
information on national draft rules (in a
broad sense) such as those foreseen by
the Directive laying down a procedure for
the provision of information in the field of
technical standards and regulations and
of rules on information society services,
today not applicable to
telecommunications and broadcasting
services (Article 1 (2), Article 1 (5) and
Annex V of Directive 98/34/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of
22 June 1998, OJ No L 204/37, 21.07.1998
as modified by Directive 98/48/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of
20 July 1998, amending Directive 98/34/EC
laying down a procedure for the provision
of information in the field of technical
standards and regulations, OJ No L
217/18, 5.08.1998). 
82. See Forrester Norall & Sutton, op cit,
Ref 60, pp 60–61, 77.
83. 1999 Review Communication, p 10.
84. On the Working Party, see Cullen
International, A Business Guide to
Changes in European Data Protection
Legislation, Kluwer Law International, The
Hague, 1999, pp 111–13.
85. Articles 29 and 30 of Directive 95/46/EC
of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 24 October 1994 on the
protection of individuals with regard to
the processing of personal data and on
the free movement of such data, OJ No L
281/31, 23.11.1995.
86. Article 31 of the Data Protection
Directive.
87. 1999 Review Communication, p 55.
88. One might indeed object that this
discretion would, in practice, not stand if
members of the NRA were national civil
servants.
89. Indeed, Comitology Committees may
be considered as an opportunity for
Council to keep indirectly a certain
interference possibility in the execution of
implementation powers delegated to the
Commission (Thomas Oppermann,
Europarecht, 2, Auflage, Verlag C.H. Beck,
Munich, 1999, pp 139–40).
90. On this issue, see Forrester Norall &
Sutton, op cit, Ref 60, pp 23–30.
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publicising the activities of NRAs throughout the Community, in
particular national consultations on specific regulatory issues and
subsequent NRA decisions’.91 With regard to ensuring harmonized
application of Community measures, this activity could explicitly be
completed with an alarm bell function in case of noted emergence of
significant discrepancies between positions of different NRAs.This task
would be similar to the one envisaged for Article 29 Group in cases
where ‘divergences likely to affect the equivalence of protection for
persons with regard to the processing of personal data in the Community
are arising between the laws or practices of Member States’.92
According to the 1999 Review Communication, another specific
activity of the HLCG could be ‘endorsing codes of practice, for use in
Member States, on issues related to the application of Community
legislation. Such codes of practice could be drawn up by the High Level
Communications Group or by other interested parties’.93 It should be
mentioned that the endorsing of a code of practice by the HLCG would,
similar to that which is the case in the context of Article 29 Group,94 not
render the code as such mandatory. It could just provide a presumption of
conformity with the relevant directives, as translated into national
measures.95 In principle, a national judge could therefore accept behaviour
that is in conformity with the code as being consistent with the
requirements of the directives concerned, although the judge remains free
to not do so.
The Commission also foresees, that the HLCG should be active in
‘resolving disputes between consumers and operators, where there is a
cross-border dimension, building upon the procedures already
established at national level and at EU level for co-ordination of NRA
actions’.96 Beyond the general comments made above with regard to
NRA involvement in dispute resolution with regard to non-binding
conciliation, the HLCG, as an assembly of NRAs, could play an
interesting role. In this case, one could apply a procedure similar to that
of the ONP Committee Working Group, envisaged under Article 26(2)
of the ONP Voice Telephony Directive.97
With regard to using the HLCG for dispute resolution by a binding
decision, we foresee many more problems. Indeed, the example given by
the 1999 Review Communication,98 Article 17 of the ONP
Interconnection Directive, considers ‘resolution of interconnection
disputes between organizations operating under authorisations granted by
different Member States, where such dispute does not fall within the
responsibility of a single national regulatory authority’.The dispute is, in
this case, solved by the NRA ‘of the Member State that has granted the
authorisation of the organisation against which the complaint is made’ (or
in case of concurrent disputes by coordinated efforts of the concerned
NRAs). In these kind of cases it is up to the NRA(s) concerned to make
a decision.They may do this by meeting in the framework of
the HLCG,but this group,or a working group of the HLCG,
could not take the decision in their place. Indeed, one might
think that,by reason of the wide discretion and independence
required,‘it is not possible, without an amendment of the EC
Treaty, to use a European Regulatory Authority (and one
could, with regard to this dispute resolution power consider the
HLCG as such) as a formal appelate tribunal with the power
to make binding decisions.However, a more limited…role in
dispute resolution, through conciliation…is possible.99
91. 1999 Review Communication, p 57.
92. Article 30 (2) of the Data Protection
Directive.
93. 1999 Review Communication, p 57.
94. Articles 27 (3) and 30 (1) (d) of the Data
Protection Directive.
95. See Article 27 (3) of the Data Protection
Directive.
96. 1999 Review Communication, p 57.
97. A similar procedure is foreseen by
Article 12 of the ONP Leased Lines
Directive. 
98. 1999 Review Communication, Ref 84.
99. NERA, Denton Hall, op cit, Ref 61, p 65.
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Efficient performance by the NRA of its tasks requires compliance with
certain principles and the presence of certain characteristics. Before
discussing two specific issues more thoroughly (independence and the
question of the possible role of self-regulation), some of these principles
and characteristics are outlined. Most of these (like the requirement for
independence100 or the obligation to provide NRAs with the necessary
means to carry out their tasks101) are already foreseen in today’s regulatory
framework and also assessed in the Fifth Implementation Report.102 In this
context, the 1999 Review Communication calls for a better application of
the principles envisaged, especially with regard to the principle that all
bodies concerned by regulatory activities (eg NRA, ministry, competition
authority, etc) should coordinate their efforts in a transparent and efficient
way103 (eg avoid delays and duplication of decision making).
Besides coordination, there is a need for NRAs to be provided with
pre-defined, clear policy lines and objectives, as well as with clearly
specified competences.The NRA should act according to the principles
of proportionality, non-discrimination and transparency. The latter
principle may need to be balanced with the requirement for
confidentiality of business strategy-related information. The NRA
should both inform and be informed,which would, among other things,
require overcoming the problem of assymetry of information with
regard to the incumbent operator, who is today still simultaneously the
main organization to be controlled and the provider of essential
information.104 Information may be obtained through the exercise of the
NRA’s control powers, through formal or informal contacts with
operators and users (eg by organizing hearings and consultations), as well
as through information received by other regulatory authorities. The
NRA should be coherent in its decisions and, in consequence,
predictable.This characteristic could be an argument for independence
from short term political interests.These decisions should be taken in a
timely manner, be reasoned and be subject to appeal procedures.
An NRA should be provided with the means necessary for carrying
out its tasks. With regard to powers, this means that it is not only
entrusted with the tasks foreseen by European directives, but that it also
has the powers needed to enforce its decisions and, finally, that it is
willing to entirely fulfil its tasks and use its powers, for example, in order
to terminate ‘counter-productive’ behaviour by incumbents105 (eg trying
to delay access by protracting negotiations, failing to provide
relevant information).With regard to financing, this means
that the NRA must have its own resources (eg licence fees
covering adminstrative costs), sufficient to free it from the
vagaries of a budget decided by third parties.With regard to
staff, an NRA should have a knowledgeable and sufficient
staff, without creating dinosaurs reluctant to apply sunset
clauses that might reduce the necessity of a fully staffed
NRA.This could imply flexible arrangements allowing the
hiring of personnel for specific tasks and limited periods, at
competitive salaries. However the Fifth Implementation
Report notes in general a difficulty for NRAs ‘of recruiting
and retaining staff in a market where liberalisation and the
rapid take-off of the market…has led to severe skills
shortages’.106 With regard to staff at executive level, the
100. See, among others, Article 5 (a) (2) of
the ONP Framework Directive.
101. See Article 18 (1) of the ONP
Interconnection Directive and recital 9 of
Directive 97/51/EC, op cit., Ref 7.
102. Especially pp 9–12, 32.
103. 1999 Review Communication, p 58.
See also Fifth Implementation Report, 
pp 9–11, 32.
104. See Alain Vallée, ‘Le régulateur face
à l’asymétrie d’information’,
Communications & Stratégies, No 14,
1994, pp 15–27. See also Fifth
Implementation Report, p 11 stating that
‘for some new entrants, over-reliance (by
NRAs) on information provided by the
incumbent is seen as an issue’.
105. Fifth Implementation Report, p 10.
106. Fifth Implementation Report, pp 11–12.
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nominations should be based on experience and know how and for
fixed but renewable terms. The directors should function as a college,
with a casting vote for the president if need be.
It should finally be noted that the Fifth Implementation Report raises
the question of the opportunity for introducing benchmarking exercises
concerning NRA’s independence and aspects of its performance like
‘supervision of the incumbent’s cost accounting, approval of the
reference interconnection offer, consultation procedures, response times
or reporting on service quality or consumer complaints’.107 With regard
to the good results that such ‘best current practice’ exercises may provide
in general,108 this appears, in principle, to be a good idea. Its usefulness
could nevertheless be discussed with regard to the fact that the
Commission’s periodical Implementation Reports acts already, to some
extent, as a national regulation and a national regulatory authority
benchmark. Furthermore, benchmarks are probably easier to put in
place, and national comparisons are more reliable, with
regard to quantifiable data (like the number of individual
licences granted), than with regard to subjective,
‘untouchable’ characteristics, like know how, openness, or
the determination of an NRA.
Independence
An NRA should be independent.This requirement aims at
ensuring improvement in quality of services; by maximizing
its own profit, the operator also maximizes the profit for
society.A regulator’s independence also enables fostering the
development of effective competition by ensuring
impartiality and objectivity of the regulator’s decision, as in
this case ‘the referee is not at the same time a player’.
The requirement of independence is explicitly envisaged in
European telecommunications regulation.109 It is underlined
by the Court of Justice110 and by the literature.111 Article 5
(a) (2) of the ONP Framework Directive (1997) states: ‘In
order to guarantee the independence of national regulatory
authorities:
• national regulatory authorities shall be legally distinct from
and functionally independent of all organizations providing
telecommu-nications networks, equipment or services,
• member states that retain ownership or a significant
degree of control of organizations providing telecommu-
nications networks and/or services shall ensure effective
structural separation of the regulatory function from
activities associated with ownership or control’.
This independence must therefore exist on two levels – the
level of the relationship between NRAs and market players
and the level of the relationship between the NRA and the
‘political’, supervisory bodies. The requested effective
structural separation between regulatory function and
activities concerning ownership or control of one (or more)
network operator or service provider, has been further
worked out in a declaration made by the representative of
the Commission to the Committee of Permanent
Representatives,112 which draws on a 1995 Commission
Communication considering the implementation of the
107. Fifth Implementation Report, p 32.
108. See, for example, Commission
Recommendation 98/195/EC of 8 January
1998 on interconnection in a liberalised
telecommunications market (Part 1 –
Interconnection pricing), OJ No L 73/42,
12.03.1998.
109. See Article 6 of Commission Directive
88/301/EEC of 16 May 1988 on competition
in the markets in telecommunications
terminal equipment, OJ No L 131/73,
27.05.1988, modified by Commission
Directive 94/46/EC, op cit, Ref 22; and
Article 7 Services Directive as well as
Article 2 (1) (b) of the Licensing Directive.
110. See for example ECJ Judgement of
19 March 1991, Case C-202/88, French
Republic v Commission of the European
Communities [1991] ECR I-1223, pts 51–52,
ECJ Judgement of 13 December 1991,
Case C-18/88, RTT [1991] ECR I-5941, pts
25–26.
111. See Bruno Lasserre, ‘L’autorité de
régulation des télécommunications (ART)’,
L’Actualité Juridique – Droit Administratif,
No 3, 20 March 1997, pp 225-226, William
H. Melody, ‘Policy objectives and models
of regulation’, in William H. Melody (ed),
Telecom Reform: Principles, Policies and
Regulatory Practices, Den Private
Ingeniørfond, Technical Universiy of
Denmark, Lyngby, 1997, esp. pp 22–25;
William H. Melody, ‘On the meaning and
importance of “independence” in telecom
reform’, Telecommunications Policy, Vol
21, No 3, pp 195–199; Melody, op cit, Ref 3,
pp 12–13, 16–21; Nihoul, op cit, Ref 8, pp
239–240, 246–248. 
112. Report of 7 June 1996 from the
Committee of Permanent Representatives
to the Council (Telecommunications)
concerning the Proposal for a European
Parliament and Council Directive
amending Council Directives 90/387/EEC
and 92/44/EEC for the purpose of
adaptation to a competitive environment
in telecommunications, 8125/96, ECO 170,
CODEC 382, 16.06.1996, Annex 1. See also
Projet de procès-verbal de la 1941e
session du Conseil (Télécommunications)
tenue à Luxembourg, le Jeudi 27 Juin
1996, excerpts published in Documents
parlementaires (B), Sénat, Session
1997/1998, 1-808/3, pp 68–69.
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Services Directive.113 According to the declaration, ‘the phrase “a
significant degree of control” implies that the government is in a
position to influence the commercial behaviour of the state-owned or
state-controlled network operator’.The declaration furthermore shows
that ‘the emphasis is on the effectiveness of the separation, not its form’
so that ‘effective structural separation could be achieved in a number of
ways depending on the legal and administrative traditions in a Member
State’. Structural separation must impeach anti-competitive information
transfer and ensure ‘that the two activities of regulation and
supervision/ownership have separate financial accounting, personal
management, and reporting structures, and that no member of staff in
either department faces a conflict of interest between the role of
government as shareholder/owner, and the role of government as
regulator’.According to the declaration, both functions could be realized
by departments of the same ministry, only if the safeguards mentioned
are guaranteed. Nevertheless, in practice, the combination of both
functions within one ministry is not the best solution, since it presents
a serious risk of conflict of interests.This problem is not solved by the
mere fact that all the different interests at stake may be perfectly
legitimate as such (eg one could imagine the maintainance of
employment in a public telecommunications operator v the overall
promotion of sector interests in ensuring the emergence of
competition). The same risks might also, owing to the solidarity of a
government’s members, be present when placing the regulatory and
operational activities in separate ministries (eg the ministry of finance
aiming to raise a maximum of funds on the occasion of an operator’s
partial or total privatization, and the minister responsible for
telecommunications in charge of giving all the operators present the
chance to raise their value in the general interest of the sector).114 Even
if, in reality, no undue interference takes place, the mere possibility,
existing under the latter two models, of seeing ownership considerations
interfering in regulatory decisions, could already be considered to some
extent as harmful to investments and legal certainty.The third possible
solution presented by the Commission’s declaration, was to place
regulatory activities with a regulatory authority that is independent
from the relevant ministry or any other minister. It should be added that,
according to the 1995 Commission Communication, independence
from a ministry does not per se exclude the control by a ministry of the
accounts and of the legality of the decisions of the regulatory authority.
I believe the latter proposal to be the best way, if the requested structural
separation is to be achieved. This proposal does not imply that the
regulatory authority becomes a ‘free floating agency’ with no
accountability to the political level. It simply implies that the legality of
the regulator’s decisions are supervised, instead of a control of decision
opportunity and a hierarchical power vested with the minister. In this
system, a Minister may annul an act of the regulatory authority for being
illegal. He may not replace the decision. Neither may he annul a
decision just for being  ‘not appropriate’.
While the independence of the NRA with regard to
operational activities is uncontested, independence with
regard to political institutions, especially government and
the minister responsible for telecommunications, raises
more questions. This concerns especially the need to
maintain this independence, in particular the third form of
structural separation described above, once a member state
113. European Commission,
Communication to the European
Parliament and the Council on the status
and implementation of Directive
90/388/EEC on competition in the markets
for telecommunications services, OJ No C
275/2, 20.10.1995, especially section III (e).
114. For organizational models see Fifth
Implementation Report, p 10.
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no longer retains ownership, nor a significant degree of control of a
telecommunications operator, in the context of privatization.The 1999
Review Communication underlines the importance of an NRA being
able to free from political interference (keep footnote 115),115 while it
should be noted, that the practice of structural separation still raises
concerns in a number of Member States,116 according to the
Commission’s assessment.
A number of arguments plead in favour of maintaining regulatory
authorities independent from political interference, even after full
privatization of public operator(s), in particular the need to avoid day to
day government influence117 and to go beyond short term goals. It is
‘indeed absolutely essential that the “competition” among the major
industry players be moved from the arena of politics and bureaucracy to
the market-place, and to achieving the industry performance objectives
of government policy.This will only happen if regulatory decisions are
made on their substantive merits, not on the basis of political favouritism
or the backdoor influence of the most powerful industry players’.118 This
is especially true, by reason of the fact that even if an incumbent
operator is no longer state-owned, government may continue to regard
it as the ‘national champion’.119 It must be ensured that the NRA can
focus on the interest of the regulated sector as such and not be captured
by other, more external interests, legitimate though they may be (eg
short-term employment in a state’s major enterprise). In this sense,
independence becomes a basic element of the NRA’s credibility and a
basic requirement for the continuity of its work.
Nevertheless the scale of competencies devolved to the NRA requires,
as counterbalance, some form of democratic accountability.120
Independence does not mean freedom to behave in an illegal way.
Therefore a supervision of legality could be appropriate. Even if, by
reason of the large discretion given to NRAs (eg in the application of
flexibility clauses, which for example require a definition as to whether a
market is competitive), the boundary between supervision of legality and
opportunity might not be easy to draw, the risk of undue interferences
by the supervising minister might be considered as not too
serious. Indeed, the minister would not be allowed to replace
an annulled NRA decision by their own ruling and the
minister’s decision itself would, in principle, be subject to
administrative appeal procedures in order to verify its
legality. This supervision of legality could be exercised on
behalf of the minister by a specialized government
commissioner. Through its ongoing character, and the
possibility of swift intervention of this supervising authority,
such supervision would usefully complement individual
appeals introduced by concerned operators against NRA
decisions, with a kind of ‘general advocate’ for legality.121
Another possibility would be, in the event of the NRA
not living up to the expectations of the rule makers, that
they may change the rules underlying an NRA’s action, eg
to define more strictly the objectives of this action. Such a
reaction would be based upon an activity report, to be
drafted annually by the NRA which could also usefully
expose market developments and the conclusions to be
drawn with regard to these developments. A further
possibility for ensuring a certain accountability of NRAs,
would be to act in the context of nominations and, for
115. 1999 Review Communication, pp 14,
58. The fact that the Communication adds
‘without prejudice to the government’s
responsibility for national policy’ to the
requirement is in our opinion not to be
considered as questioning the principle,
but rather as a confirmation that the NRA’s
role is limited to ‘rule-application’. See
also European Commission, op cit, Ref 21,
p 13: ‘regulatory authorities should be
independent of government and operators’.
116. Fifth Implementation Report, p 10.
117. Melody, op cit, Ref 3, p 12.
118. Ibid, p 17.
119. Fifth Implementation Report, p 10.
120. See in this context recital 9 of
Directive 97/51/EC, op cit, Ref 7: ‘the
requirement of independence is without
prejudice to the institutional autonomy
and constitutional obligations of the
Member States’.
121. In this context see also: ‘The proposed
new regulatory framework would set out
clear and explicit objectives for NRAs,
and any NRA decisions that go against
these objectives would constitute an
infringement of Community legislation’ that
would be recriminated by the Commission
(1999 Review Communication, p 10).
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example, not reappoint an NRA’s managers once their term of duty
comes to an end.
The question of the NRA’s accountability may be seen in a broader
context than accountability to governments and courts. Accountability
could also, to some extent, be considered with regard to the industry and
the public.122 This could be realized through the NRA’s activity report, but
also through public consultations, where it could be important to ensure
equal opportunity to participate to all concerned, not only to industry.
One might finally consider that, if one of the reasons behind an NRA’s
independence is distance from day to day political interference and short
term goals, placing the NRA in some way or another in the bosom of
the parliament, instead of that of the government, might also not be a
good idea.
The impact of self-regulation
The regulatory function should in principle be carried out by a public
body.123 Nevertheless there is, and will be, a place for both public NRA
and private self-regulation. Despite the fact that the sector representatives
are rather sceptical about the idea,124 there might indeed be an interesting
complementary role to be played by industry ‘self-regulation’, even with
regard to electronic communication infrastructures and associated
services.125 This would go beyond content regulation, where self-
regulation seems to be highly appropriate, as is shown by Council
conclusions on the role of self-regulation in the light of the development
of new media services.126 Self-regulation could be especially
useful in the context of highly technical issues, such as
standard setting or interconnection, which require specific
know how. Furthermore, in principle ‘such measures can be
more easily and quickly agreed or adapted than
legislation’.127 The procedure nonetheless raises some
comments.
In the case of self-regulation, the borderline between rule
making and rule application is particularly thin. Indeed this is
the case as self-regulating bodies both adopt the rules and
apply them within their circle. Enforcement could be
typically ensured by traditional courts in cases brought before
them by concerned parties.An instrument established by self-
regulation may have binding internal force, if all the members
of an association have worked out and accepted it, or if the
instrument has been established, eg by the board of such an
association. This is so if this board was duly mandated and
even more so if there is ratification by a general assembly.
In principle, self-regulation can only have legal binding
effect128 beyond the group that has adopted that specific
instrument if it is flanked by legal measures providing for
this binding force129 by giving legitimacy to the results of
self-regulation concerned. In these cases it is therefore more
appropriate to use the concepts of ‘cooperative self-
regulation’130 or of ‘state regulated self-regulation’.131 The
procedure envisaged with regard to standards and/or
specifications by Article 5 of the ONP Framework Directive
is an example.132 One could nevertheless imagine that a judge
might give certain consequences to these instruments as such,
considering them as an expression of common practice of a
sector.133
122. Melody, op cit, Ref 3, pp 17, 20.
123. We do not address in this section the
case where the body entrusted by the
State with the function of regulatory
authority adopts a private law form
(eventually as company fully owned by
the State).
124. Eurostrategies, Cullen International,
op cit, Ref 5, pp 35, 81.
125. 1999 Review Communication, eg 
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126. 27 September 1999, OJ No C 283/2,
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diverses techniques de réglementation
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One could discuss whether, in the context of industry self-regulation
aiming at binding effects, the principle of separation between
operational and regulatory functions is still respected.To ensure the main
goal of this separation, emergence and maintainance of fair competition,
procedures should guarantee both the possible participation of all those
eventually concerned and a fair balance of bargaining power, especially
when the instrument worked out aims at having external effects, but also
when it is limited to internal binding force. One might, in this case,
nevertheless wonder whether this way of proceeding might not lead to
complex structures and to a certain ‘re-invention’ of democracy.
It should be added that instruments worked out by associations of
sector representatives may be useful, even if the group which drafts them
does not envisage them having binding force. In this case simple non-
binding guidelines may provide useful orientation to concerned parties.
In this context, a useful example may be guidelines established by the
European Telecommunications Platform with regard to interconnection
agreements.134
Conclusion
What will be the future of telecommunications national regulatory
authorities taking into account the way in which the European
telecommunications regulatory framework in general, and the European
Commission’s 1999 Review Communication in particular, addresses
NRAs, their scope, their tasks and their characteristics?
An NRA is, in principle, entrusted with ‘rule application’ rather than
with ‘rule making tasks’.The scope of today’s telecommunications NRA
should be widened to include all electronic communications
infrastructure and associated services, though it should, in principle, not
address content related issues.
There will be a need for sector specific regulatory authorities, in
particular for managing the transition towards effective competition, but
also in general for all those issues needing a proactive and structuring
approach. On the other hand, NRAs should in future no longer be
entrusted with the task of dispute settlement by decisional power.
Among the characteristics a regulator should present, the following are
highlighted: that it should be independent, provided with the necessary
means and should be coordinated as much within its national territory
with regard to other regulatory authorities, especially the competition
authority, as outside its state’s boundaries.This latter coordination could
usefully be organized under the auspices of a High Level
Communications Group.Nevertheless, even the best coordination might,
in the future and in some specific cases, still not negate the need to
consider the creation of a European regulatory authority.The regulator’s
work could, in some cases, be usefully completed by activities of self-
regulation bodies.
134. ETP, Framework interconnection
agreement guidelines, Brussels, June
1998, p 31, http://bscw2.ispo.cec.be/
infosoc/telecompolicy/en/interconref.doc.
For other ETP documents, see http://
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